­permissiveness but may simultaneously undermine the institutional dimension if, for example, the far right en­gages or threatens to engage in legal action. UK’s Re­form party is a case in point: in 2024 the BBC apologised to Reform UK for calling the party»far-right«. Since then, both in the UK and elsewhere in Europe, journalists and media outlets have systematically refrained from using the term»far-right« for fear of legal repercussions (Hope Not Hate 2024). → Isolation/cordon sanitaire(party-system dimension): this strategy might help to tackle the issue of party system permissiveness but may at the same time be used as a campaign strategy by the far right to mobilise more pe­ripheral voters(voter dimension). Given the trade-offs, these strategies have broken down in most countries where they have been used, such as in the case of the Sweden Democrats(SD). → Party bans and legal sanctions(institutional dimension): this strategy can be used specifically in contexts in which far-right parties engage in violent and criminal activities. While it can help to strengthen the institu­tional dimension, it may also serve to galvanise latent support for the far right(voter dimension). Greece’s Golden Dawn(GD) party is a case in point. The par­ty’s leading cadres were tried and convicted for main­taining a criminal organisation and the party was sub­sequently outlawed. While this strategy was success­ful in eliminating GD, latent support(voter ­dimension) was later channelled into votes for other far-right par­ties with less e­ xtremist ideologies, including the Spar­tans(subsequently banned), Greek ­Solution, Victory and Voice of Reason. (iii) Assess: consider the trade-offs when deciding which ­dimension to prioritise, as a particular strategy might help to strengthen one dimension while simultaneously weakening another. Conclusions and recommendations The framework presented here provides a structured tool for conducting cross-regional comparisons, mapping far-right success across multiple cases through a visual format, and formalising threat levels across scenarios by grounding each dimension in measurable indicators. This way we may capture not only the magnitude of the threat but also its source; in other words, whether the primary vulnerability or strength in each case stems from the voter base, the party system or the institutional framework. There are three key takeaways from this analysis: (i) Adapt: there is no one-size-fits-all solution, as different threat scenarios may vary according to time and/or country, depending on which dimension is stronger or more vulnerable. (ii) Prioritise: accordingly, we may emphasise counterstrat­egies, depending on whether the main source of vul­nerability or strength in each case and at a particular point in time stems from voter support, party dynamics or institutional fragility. Arenas of far-right threat and democratic resilience 5