Programa de Cooperación en Seguridad Regional I. The general context It must be extremely difficult to evaluate the new administration in Washington from afar. The expectations were so high, unrealistically high, that if you read the European or Latin American press in the months following Obama's election, it must have appeared as if the world's problems were about to be solved. It reminds me a little of how I felt when John F. Kennedy was elected in 1960 – he was so charming, so well spoken, his wife and children were delightful, and he had beaten a man who was as Antipático as it was possible for a politician to be. Obama was the same. He said all the right things and seemed so in tune with the interests of democratic countries in every region of the world. In the case of Obama, part of the euphoria felt around the world had to do with the deep resentment toward the previous administration, especially its bellicose rhetoric and its unilateralism. To this must be added the bemused wonder­ment at the opposition ticket, especially the candidate for vice-president, who struck outside observers as something very strange indeed. Instead of the Ugly American, Obama seemed like the Good­looking American. But, in foreign policy, things began badly for the new administration. The economic crisis that had exploded in the last year of the Bush administration was only getting worse as Obama took office, and it was spreading around the world. As if this were not distraction enough, it was made clear almost immediately, that the local partners in both theaters of war, Iraq and Afghanistan, were not going to behave the way Candidate Obama had hoped they would, and President Obama, because of his campaign platform, was locked into a long, conflicted debate among his advisers as to how to conduct what soon would be called“his war” in Afghanistan. In other crisis spots to which the candidate had offered a new approach, much the same thing happened. The Iranians were not interested in dialogue; the Israelis dug in their heels in opposition to a two state settlement, and the Russians were not ready to settle all of the differences bet­ween them and the U.S. In the case of the Russians, Obama was able to secure a significant, if modest, reduction in nuclear arms in the early months of 2010. With regard to Latin America, there was not much material to go on during the campaign. There were hints about a change in policy toward Cuba, hints about immigration reform, and a bold statement about a new approach to the problem of drugs in the United States and drug traffic­king. Beyond that, all analysts had to go on was a stated preference for multilateralism and working closely with other nations in the solution of common problems, which struck most observers in Latin America as a very promising start. Before any serious policy planning could occur, there was intense preparation for the Summit of the Americas, which became a glorious photo-op for everyone. Nothing of substance was accomplished. Meanwhile, the administration's choice for Assistant Secretary of State, Arturo July 2010, Page 2