Programa de Cooperación en Seguridad Regional than at any time in the past. In the case of Brazil, there is greater give and take bet­ween the militaries of the two countries and between the drug enforcement agencies of the two countries than at any time in the past. Even the Brazilian navy has signed an agreement with the U.S. for cooperation. In this last case, the conse­quences of cooperation have regional and global consequences. Because of the recession and the role that organized labor plays in Obama's administration, the trade agenda has lost the salience it had during the Bush adminis­tration. Obama, himself, appears to be sympathetic to the free trade treaties under discussion and his principal economic advisers certainly favor trade opening; but the administration is unwilling to take on this challenge at a time when it is overwhel­med by international affairs and internal crises, such as the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, that occupies so much of the president's time and energy. More generally, the Department of Homeland Security has succeeded in winning the collaboration of many coun­tries on such programs as the Smart Ports, review of passenger lists on incoming flights, and allowing what amounts to ship­rider agreements that allow U.S. personnel to conduct search and seizure operations in foreign lands. To take the most notable example, again a policy begun during the Bush administration, the port of Buenos Aires, once the“dirtiest” in the Americas, is now fully secured by a bilateral force under the direction of U.S. personnel. And, this in a country whose leaders enjoy denouncing the U.S. And, there is ongoing cooperation on counter-terrorism even though the U.S. has not been able to convince any country that terrorism is a problem for them. This suggests that the U.S. enjoys a reserve of good will in the region that might be turned to more effect if the Obama administration can come up with a policy that addresses the interests and the needs of the Latin American nations. It is crucial in the months and years ahead that the unilatera­lism of the Bush administration that so alienated nations throughout the world be converted into a multilateral, collegial approach to dealing with common pro­blems. To succeed, however, such a transi­tion requires a clear, constructive response from the nations of Latin America, as I shall explain in the following section of this paper. Finally, the Department of State and the Pentagon agree that Brazil is the only strategic option for the U.S. in the region and that it is in the interests of the U.S. to have such an ally. At this writing, govern­ment officials in Washington are still trying to figure out what this means. Even the recent Brazilian gambit in Iran has not deterred the Obama administration. In part, this is due to the fact that the officials see no other option. And, they are convin­ced that the basic strategic needs of the administration are better served by multila­teralism than by unilateralism. We may expect that the ramifications of this deci­sion will be worked out in greater detail over the coming year. What makes this process interesting to analysts of interna­tional affairs and puzzling to U.S. govern­ment officials is precisely the fact that it July 2010, Page 6