United States Policy and Security Interests in Latin America personnel? Is it possible for some ad hoc group of nations, including Brazil, to serve as a fact finding instrument in the dispute between Colombia and Venezuela? This would be a prelude to an effort to mediate the conflict and take as its model the ad hoc group that stopped the fighting between Peru and Ecuador in the 1990s. Is there a Latin American trade agenda? Research on how this works at the sub-regional level, in Mercosur, suggests that agreement is more likely if the focus is kept small. For example, agreements confined to one industry are more likely to win approval than broader efforts to open(or close) markets. It is easier to reach agreement on procedures than on tariffs. One obvious initiative that would win U.S. support would be to make public sector contracting transparent. Policies to reduce the traffic in small arms are an excellent example of how nations in Latin America can seize leadership in a manner that maximizes their interests while not threatening the interests of the U.S. It is notorious and lamentable that the gun lobby in the U.S. has blocked all efforts to control the export of small arms from the U.S. As a consequence, the U.S. cannot participate in hemispheric efforts to bring the flow of weapons under control. But, why can't the nations of Latin America create a common policy to restrict the importation of such weapons? There is evidence that the U.S. would be more than willing to abide by the laws of friendly nations in an effort to bring the illegal traffic under control. Ultimately, the best policies to maximize the autonomy of the nations in Latin America must rely on their capacity to influence others. Except for Brazil and except for the narrow, market influence provided by the production and export of specific commodities, all of the countries in the region influence other nations through their Soft Power. The more consistent, the more predictable a nation, the more relevant its opinion becomes and the greater its potential influence on policy debates at the regional and global levels. Consistency and fixed purpose have given Chile more than its share of influence. On the other hand, Brazil's effort to intervene in the Iranian nuclear dispute suffered more from Lula's response to the brutal suppression of the protests by the Iranian government, than it did from its unfortunate timing. Power, in the old fashioned sense, is still important; but it only goes so far. No single country has the power to bend others to its will whenever it chooses. Agreements are necessary; persuasion is necessary. In such a world, the nations of Latin America have an opportunity. They must learn how to use their influence. 1 “América Latina en el Nuevo sistema internacional: la necesidad del pensamiento estratégico,” in Tulchin and Espach, América Latina en el Nuevo sistema internacional, Ediciones Bellaterra(2004). 2 Tulchin, Benitez and Diamint.(eds.) El Rompecabezas. Conformando la seguridad hemisférica en el siglo XXI. Prometeo(2006). July 2010, Page 11
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