Programa de Cooperación en Seguridad Regional biggest loss for the nations of the region will be as potential actors in world affairs. They may act individually, of course. To be more effective, they should act as a group. To act as a group, they must learn how to build consensus among themselves. At the hemispheric level, that same consensus is necessary in order to deal in a constructive manner with the U.S., now willing to deal with them as partners and colleagues and not merely as subordinates. IV. What lies ahead: Policy Recommendations The Obama administration, with its rejection of unilateralism and its genuine preference for collegial action in all regions of the world, represents an opportunity of historic dimensions for the nations of Latin America. It is as if they have been invited to the table to participate in the formation of a community of nations. They have been invited before – to summits, to meetings of the OAS, to ministerial meetings – but never without an agenda fixed in advance by the United States. As I have argued before, to be a rule maker, it is necessary to offer something for the common agenda other than querulous complaints about the hegemonic power 1 . That was then; this is now. And, as has been suggested elsewhe­re, making agendas can be done with reference to different forums or on diffe­rent levels – sub-regional, regional, hemisp­heric or global 2 . Policy recommendations, therefore, can be aimed at maximizing autonomy in different forums and propose action in different contexts. Given that the U.S. believes it will maximize its own interests in the hemisphe­re through the good offices of a strategic partner and that Brazil is the best option available, it would be useful for all of the nations in the region to consider how such a strategic partnership affects their inte­rests and whether they are prepared to operate through Brazilian leadership or if they prefer to act on their own. In my opinion, Brazil would maximize the levera­ge of its leadership at the hemispheric and regional levels if it were to avoid anachro­nistic anti-American gestures. We may anticipate that the new government that will replace the Lula administration will not be bound by some of the old fashioned ideas that have driven the Brazilian debate. However, the new government must rely to some degree on Itamaraty for advice, so we can expect efforts by Brazil to exert leaders­hip on the agenda outside of South America to create difficulties for many members of the hemispheric community, including the U.S. Let us not forget that the U.S. never has relied on a strategic partner. It is by no means guaranteed that the relationship will be a congenial one for the U.S. Given the fact that the U.S. is focused on its domestic agenda as well as the two wars in which it is involved, propo­sals for collective action will be more likely to win U.S. support if they are consistent with that domestic agenda. For example, can Mexico and the nations of Central America put together a plan for collective action against organized crime that does not rely on excessive use of the military? Can a regional approach to counter­narcotics work without the presence of U.S. July 2010, Page 10