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United States policy and security interests in Latin America
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Programa de Cooperación en Seguridad Regional to other nations in the region, especially Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, to form a Bolivarian Alliance(ALBA). Chavez has attempted to bring other nations into the alliance and has attempted to create regional institutions that would explicitly exclude the U.S., but with little success. He has supported the leaders in other ALBA countries in their efforts to consolidate their control over the state and has made it clear that he has a view of democratic governance that does not coincide with the majority view in the hemisphere. Although the program of the Bolivarian revolution is far from clear, Chavez and his ALBA associates have succeeded in blocking all matters of substance in the OAS and have shifted their support to the newer, untested South American Union(UNASUR). Chavez also represents the only exception to the progress made in mutual confidence among neighbors in smaller, sub-regional groups. His hostility to Colombia and his willingness to stir trouble with the FARC on the Colombian side of the border, stands as the only exception to an ever deeper commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes in the region. The willingness of Peru and Chile to submit their maritime dispute to international arbitration is the most noteworthy step in this direction. Bolivia's unwillingness even to discuss its dispute with Chile remains a peaceful deadlock. Elsewhere, coopera­tion among neighbors with a history of conflict continues to grow and the institu­tional architecture of collaboration at the sub-regional level continues to develop. The inexorable logic of intermestic pro­blems those problems that are at once local and international and cannot be solved by any single nation is the driving force in building mutual confidence in dealing with common problems. The most significant example of historical confidence building is between Mexico and the United States over how to deal with the illegal traffic in drugs. Given the violence along the border between the two nations it is difficult to say that progress is being made. Nevertheless, cooperation between the two countries never has been more effective. And, now that the Obama administration has appointed a drug czar who is committed to dealing with the demand side in the use of drugs, it is possible that in the years ahead we may see some progress in dealing with the scourge of drugs at the sub-regional and the hemispheric levels. However, it is necessary to point out that Mexico, one of the major countries in Latin America, is so thoroughly distracted by the war on drugs that it is unlikely to play a major role in hemispheric affairs in the next year or two. The weakness of the Calderon government in the international community was manifest in its curious reluctance to play an active role in dealing with the crisis in Honduras in 2009. On the other hand, the Central American nations displayed unexpected collegiality in dealing with the Honduras crisis. Their chosen representative, Oscar Arias of Costa Rica, had a solution to the crisis negotiated which was blocked by a combination of opposition by a few conservatives in the U.S. Senate and by the Chavez govern­ment. Although they were not successful July 2010, Page 8