United States Policy and Security Interests in Latin America does not depend on unilateral decisions in Washington. It depends on some form of dialogue with an informal partner, Brazil, at a time when that partner is not certain exactly what its own international role is supposed to be and how it is to deal with the United States. As the Chinese might say, these are interesting times. III. The Latin American response The shift by the Obama administra­tion from a unilateral to a multilateral approach to dealing with international issues or problems represents a major opportunity for the nations of Latin America. The willingness on the part of the U.S. government to dialogue with collea­gues in the hemisphere and not merely impose its will on weaker states offers to Latin America the possibilities of autono­mous action in many areas of global interaction; of participation in setting policies for dealing with hemispheric issues (rule making); and, of making sure that their own concerns form part of the hemispheric agenda. There has not been such an opportunity for collective action since the euphoric days in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, when many believed that international organizations, especially the United Nations, would become the stage for peaceful settlement of international disputes. That moment passed quickly and twenty years later we are witness to another moment for Latin American protagonism. It was not surprising that, after nearly two centuries of subordination to outside powers, the nations of Latin America – with some important exceptions - were unprepared to assume the burdens of autonomous action in the international community when the Cold War ended. Twenty years later, the expectations are much higher; but, there does not appear to be a“Latin American” response or a“Latin American” position on the major issues of the day. In fact, there are as many serious disagreements among the nations of the region as at any time since the beginning of the Cold War, more than half a century ago. We appear to be as far away from hemisp­heric consensus on major issues as ever, despite the fact that the architecture of hemispheric cooperation is much more fully articulated than at any time in the past and despite the fact that the level of mutual confidence among nations in several sub­regions(Central America, the Anglophone Caribbean, Mercosur) has never been higher. And, as I have said earlier in this paper, this higher level of mutual confiden­ce has not been sufficient to get the nations of Central America to agree on how to deal with the institutional crisis in Honduras in 2009, nor to cooperate collectively with SouthCom within CFAC. The fact of the matter is that the community of nations in the hemisphere is sharply divided along the lines of basic ideology and commitment to democratic governance. President Hugo Chavez, of Venezuela, has declared his commitment for a Bolivarian Revolution which combines his version of socialism with an anti­imperialism that echoes sentiments of the 1960s, without the context of the Cold War. Chavez is a strong supporter of the Castro regime in Cuba and has reached out July 2010, Page 7