The economic foundation sustaining Yeongnam hegemony in Daegu, the outflow of young peo­ple due to extreme capital-region concentration, the gender imbalance embedded in the Gwangju­type job model, and the economic frustration ex­perienced by younger generations in Chuncheon and Busan have all served as fertile ground for the rise of far-right populism and hate-based politics. As analyzed in the Seoul forum, The po­liticization of hate forms the structural backdrop of the democratic crisis—where young people, forced into survival competition under an un­equal and unstable socio-economic system, redi­rect their anger toward vulnerable social groups such as women and immigrants, legitimized through narratives of meritocracy and“fairness.” When democracy fails to reduce inequality and poverty—when it cannot demonstrate the tangi­ble efficacy that“democracy puts food on the ta­ble”—anti-constitutional forces inevitably exploit that void. This challenge also reflects the structural limita­tions that persisted even after democratization in 1987, in which the conservative party system, authoritarian modes of control, and conglomer­ates influence remained intact. It is inseparable from the fact that democratization forces failed to build an independent political base, were in­stead absorbed into existing parties, and could not establish a representative–accountable rela­tionship that genuinely advocated for the socially and economically marginalized. The full consolidation of democracy cannot be separated from the task of economic democrati­zation—reducing asset inequality, ensuring bal­anced regional development, and creating de­cent employment. Where these matters extend beyond the scope of this proposal, they remain among the most essential challenges that a gov­ernment grounded in popular sovereignty must address to restore and secure democracy. 2. Role of Civil Society: From Crisis Response to Everyday Democratic Practice The December 3 insurrection revealed the over­whelming strength and resilience of Korean civil society—its capacity to unite in times of crisis. Yet, as noted in the Busan forum, the critical question now is how this immense energy that once filled the squares can be organized and sus­tained once people return to their everyday lives. Going forward, civil society must convert the ex­plosive mobilizing power of the“square” into the practice of democracy in“everyday life.” As raised in the Seoul forum, the challenge is how citizens who once stood in the square can maintain and organize that civic power once they disperse after impeachment. This requires seeking new forms of organization beyond traditional civic groups, illustrated by the case in which teachers—fol­lowing the Seoi Elementary School teacher’s death—mobilized through online communities, not through labor unions. Civil society must also take an active role in the regional public spheres emphasized in this proposal, evolving from over­sight and resistance into agents of everyday, sub­stantive grassroots democracy. 3. Conclusion: Breaking from Constitutional Order Saboteurs and Advancing a Qualita­tively Mature Democracy The constitutional crisis of December 3, 2024 redrew the political line in Korea—not between “conservative vs. progressive,” but between demo­cratic forces that defend the Constitution and an­ti-democratic forces that deny it. The restoration of democracy must begin not only with holding the self-coup actors accountable, but with a clear rupture from the anti-constitutional forces them­18